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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
fearing loss of driving privileges, may possibly be discouraged from seek-
ing necessary treatment. It is conceivable that the driver posing the highest
risk to society, who faces almost certain loss of his license if reported,
riight forego treatment, continue to drive as his condition worsens, and
eventually kill himself and others. If he had sought treatment, he might
have improved or been cured. This assumption may be purely speculative
and is founded on the presumption that the patient avoiding treatment
because of the law is aware of its existence. In fact, the general public
probably is not aware of the law. Nevertheless, the risk that some, and
perhaps many, drivers with reportable problems will be discouraged from
seeking needed medical help must be weighed in any evaluation of section
20-17.1.
In conclusion, the statute appears to be a valid exercise of the power
of the state to protect the motoring public, pedestrians, and the affected
individuals. However, to avoid possible constitutional defects and to
achieve fully the policy behind the legislation, the present law may need to
be broadened to require reporting of all patients possessing the enumerated
characteristics whether they are institutionalized or not. Moreover, it
would be desirable for some concessions to be made in the area of psychi-
atric treatment. Finally, in view of the present reporting rate, the
appropriate penalty provisions85 should be utilized to bring about full
compliance.
JAMES E. CLINE
Poverty Law-Is a Search Warrant Required for Home Visitation
by Welfare Officials?
The fact that public assistance is a statutory right means, therefore,
that it is subject to conditions imposed by the Legislature. . . . It
means that the Legislature may require that the applicant waive his
right to privacy to permit a thorough investigation of his eligibility
for public assistance. It means that the applicant must open his home
to admit representatives of the Welfare Department to enter and to
observe. . . [I]f he refuses to submit and refuses to permit such
infringement upon his right to privacy, then he may not exercise his
right to receive public assistance.'
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-35 (1965) provides that it is a misdemeanor to violate
any of the article's provisions, which is punishable by a fine up to five-hundred
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than six months.
1 Ruebhausen & Brim, Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 CoLum. L. Rnv.
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The foregoing remarks were made by a high-ranking official in the
New York City Department of Social Services and represent the widely-
held theory that public assistance is a "gratuity" furnished by the state
and thus may be made subject to whatever conditions the state sees fit
to impose. This idea has recently been successfully challenged in James
v. Goldberg-a case adding to the slowly rising reservoir of case law
defining the rights of welfare recipients.
Mrs. James, a resident of the city of New York and a recipient of
payments under Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),'
received a letter from her caseworker requesting an appointment to visit
her at her home. She replied that under no circumstances could the
caseworker make a home visit. The caseworker explained that the law
required home visits4 and that refusal by Mrs. James to permit them
would result in the termination of her AFDC benefits. At a subsequent
hearing, the Department of Social Services' review officer upheld the case-
worker's decision to terminate benefits. Mrs. James then commenced a
suit in which she sought to prevent the termination of the benefits on the
grounds that such action constituted a violation of her fourth-amendment
right to be secure from unreasonable searches of her home and of her
fourth- and ninth-amendment rights to privacy.
In opposition to the plaintiff's application for relief, the Department
urged that home visits by caseworkers were not searches since the pur-
poses for them were to verify eligibility for public assistance and to offer
the recipient professional counseling.5 The department pointed out that
caseworkers were instructed not to enter homes without permission or
under false pretenses and not to look into closets or drawers.6 In reject-
ing these arguments, the three-judge district court relied on recent Su-
preme Court decisions establishing that an individual's right to privacy
is within the scope of the protection of the fourth amendment.7 Un-
1184, 1203 (1965) (quoting the then Deputy Commissioner of the New York City
Department of Social Services).'303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), prob. juris. noted sub norn., Wyman v.
James 38 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1970).a 42 U.S.C. § 601-10 (Supp. III, 1965-67). The Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children program provides aid to needy children who have been "deprived
of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the
home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent" and who live with any of cer-
tain enumerated relatives. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1) (Supp. III 1965-67).
'See N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 134 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
'303 F. Supp. at 939.
0Id. at 940.
"Id. at 940-42. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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doubtedly an influential factor was the New York law providing that if
a caseworker visited a home and found any evidence of fraud, he would
be obligated to report what he observed' even though the visit was not
for that purpose. The court was compelled to recognize the paradoxical
nature of a caseworker's job-that his duties are dichotomous. He is
trained to give professional counseling; yet he must also serve as an in-
former. The court therefore concluded that all home visits "may ap-
propriately be considered searches for evidence of welfare fraud or other
criminal activity."9
The constitutionality of home visits by caseworkers to provide coun-
seling has never before been questioned. Traditionally caseworkers have
had ready access to recipients' homes. In a recent study of the attitudes
of recipients of AFDC in Wisconsin toward unannounced visits by case-
workers, those receiving payments were asked the following question:
"Should a welfare client have the right to refuse access to his home to a
caseworker who calls unannounced?" Less than twenty-eight per cent
of those questioned answered this question affirmatively. 10 However, the
study did not cover the situation that was perhaps the most significant
fact in James-the caseworker's being refused admittance after having
made an appointment with the welfare client.
On the other hand, welfare searches (as distinguished from counseling
visits) have long been under attack by civil libertarians although only
one case was found in which the question has been litigated. In Parrish
v. Civil Service Commission," early-morning mass raids, primarily
for the purpose 2 of securing proof of welfare ineligibility in order
to reduce the number of persons on public assistance, had been made
on the homes of recipients of AFDC. No search warrants had been
obtained, but each home had been searched thoroughly. On appeal from
denial of a petition for reinstatement brought by a caseworker who had
refused to participate and had been dismissed, the Supreme Court of
California held that the raids were unconstitutional." Despite the court's
condemnation of the mass raids, there was no suggestion that all searches
by welfare officials are illegal. The court's repudiation was, in fact,
8 See note 33 infra and accompanying text.
' 303 F. Supp. at 944.
10 Handier & Hollingsworth, Stigma, Privacy, and Other Attitudes of Welfare
Recipients, 22 STAN. L. IEv. 1, 11 (table 6) (1969).
166 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967).
1 Evidently another purpose was to counter local criticism of the AFDC pro-
gram by exhibiting the infrequency of fraud.
66 Cal. 2d 623, 425 P.2d at 225, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
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limited to mass raids conducted at a time "inconvenient" for the re-
cipient.14 If the decision in Parrish is strictly interpreted, it is not au-
thority against a warrantless search of a welfare recipient's home made
at a reasonable hour.
Although Parrish is the only reported decision prior to James in
which a court has dealt directly with the merits of searches of the homes
of those receiving welfare payments, there have occasionally been other
instances of formal complaints filed in court concerning the issue. For
example, in a case from the District of Columbia,15 a welfare recipient
sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against allegedly
unlawful and harassing searches and surveillance by investigators of the
District Department of Public Welfare. The recipient averred that the
Department had threatened to terminate her assistance payments unless
she allowed the searches. Denial of relief by the district court was af-
firmed on the ground that administrative remedies had not been ex-
hausted. 0 Undoubtedly, the infrequency of similar challenges 7 is evi-
dence of the understandable reluctance of welfare recipients to dispute
the authority of those upon whom they are totally dependent for support.
An analogous situation arising from the actions of other administrative
agencies led to the first serious constitutional challenge of civil searches
in the federal courts. In Frank v. Maryland,"8 the Supreme Court upheld
the conviction in state court of a homeowner who had refused to permit
a municipal health inspector to enter his premises without a search war-
rant. The Court's rationale was that "[n] o evidence for criminal prosecu-
tion is sought to be seized."' 9 This decision was overruled in Camara v.
Municipal Court.20 A lessee had refused to allow a warrantless inspection
" Perhaps the court in Parrish would have been willing to hold all searches
by welfare officials illegal had they not been compelled to distinguish the facts of
Parrish from those of Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), in which the
Supreme Court had upheld a warrantless health inspection. The court in Parrish
stated that "[t]he great gulf which separates an 'orderly' afternoon visit from the
searches conducted shortly after dawn in the present case would itself suffice to
deprive defendant of any support from the Frank opinion." Id. at 267, 425 P.2d
at 228, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 628. Frank has since been overruled in Camara v. United
States, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
" Smith v. Board of Comm'rs, 380 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1967), noted in 9
WELFARE L. BULL. 4 (1967).
380 F.2d at 633.
Bradley v. Gingsberg, Civ. No. 3047 (S.D.N.Y., filed August 10, 1967),
noted in 10 WELFARE L. BULL. 8 (1967), is another example of a suit complain-
ing of searches brought by a welfare recipient.
"359 U.S. 360 (1959).
°Id. at 366..o387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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of his apartment by housing inspectors. Although the inspection could
not have resulted in criminal prosecution, the Court struck down the
civil-criminal distinction that it had articlulated in Frank and held that a
citizen has the right to keep his private premises free from being entered
for administrative safety and health inspections without the authority of
a warrant.
Although in Camara the Court was concerned with inspections by a
city's building investigators and limited its decision to "administrative
searches of the kind at issue here,"'" the rationale of the holding 2 should
extend to administrative visits to the homes of welfare recipients. The
majority in James relied in part on Camara in reaching its decision.28
Before Camara, if the immediate purpose of the search was to determine
eligibility for welfare rather than to initiate criminal prosecution, the
proposition that the search required no warrant was at least colorably
supportable. An argument for this proposition after the decision in
Camara is indeed difficult to accept. There is a less demanding public
interest in searches of welfare recipients' homes than in health and safety
inspections because of the unavailability of equally effective substitutes
for the latter. To inspect a home for building-code violations requires
access into the home; to ascertain eligibility for welfare or to provide
counseling does not.24
Nevertheless, Judge McLean, dissenting in James, voiced his fear
that extending the fourth amendment to require warrants for counseling
visits would hobble caseworkers in their attempts to carry out the aims
of the AFDC program:
We are concerned here with a program of public assistance to depen-
dent children who are to be cared for in their homes .... It is essen-
tial that the welfare workers who administer this program enter the
Id. at 534.
'2 [W]e hold that administrative searches of the kind at issue here are sig-
nificant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment,
that such searches when authorized and conducted without a warrant pro-
cedure lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guaran-
tees to the individual ....
Id.
23 303 F. Supp. at 941.
' One AFDC supervisor stated that although refusals to allow entrance into
the home for counseling were rare, the department's policy was to honor the re-
fusal. Implicit in this policy is the recognition that home visits are not imperative
in the AFDC program. Interview with Ann De Main, Supervisor of AFDC pro-
gram, Durham County, North Carolina, in Durham, Feb. 9, 1970.
[Vol. 481014
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children's home to ascertain the conditions under which they live.
The purpose of the visit is to assist the children, not to catch the chil-
dren's mother in a violation of the law.25
But this language indicates that Judge McLean overlooked the fact that
a visit by a caseworker may be for any one of three often-overlapping
purposes. First, the purpose of the visit may be the one to which Judge
McLean addresses himself-to provide social services. Second, the visit
may be to determine welfare eligibility. Finally, it may be for the sole
purpose of searchng for evidence of welfare fraud.
In James, all of these categories were lumped together as "searches"
for which a warrant must be obtained if consent is not given. The court
stated that "for [a] search of private property in a particular case, applica-
tion may be made to an appropriate judicial officer who, utilizing the
standard of 'probable cause,' will test the particular decision to search
against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness."2 6 The court inti-
mated that Camara, which provides a relaxed standard of probable cause
for administrative searches, should provide guidelines for the issuance
of a warrant to welfare officials. The Supreme Court in Camara em-
phasized that "'a health official need [not] show the same kind of proof
to a magistrate to obtain a warrant as one must who would search for the
fruits or instrumentalities of a crime.' ",27
The approach to probable cause in Camara leaves much to be desired,
especially when the standard of that decision is applied to visits to
recipients by welfare officials. The criteria suggested by the Supreme
Court that might constitute probable cause for health and safety in-
spections (such as the length of the interval between inspections or the
general condition of the area)28 would not be helpful in legitimizing
official visits to welfare recipients. And unless judicial approval is to
be a "rubber stamp," an allegation that the visit is merely to provide
professional guidance for the recipient should not demonstrate sufficient
" 303 F. Supp. at 946 (dissenting opinion).
2'6 303 F. Supp. at 943-44.
" 387 U.S. at 538, quoting from Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Frank
v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 383 (1959).
" The court in Camara stated that
[s]uch standards [of probable cause] which will vary with the municipal
program being enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the nature
of the building (e.g., a multi-family apartment house), or the conditions
of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend upon specific knowl-
edge of the conditions of the particular building.
387 U.S. at 538.
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cause for a warrant under even a relaxed standard." Rightly understood,
the practical thrust of James is that if the recipient does not wish to have
counseling done within his home, it cannot be forced upon him even though
the visit purports to be for the sole purpose of benefitting his children.
If the court's decision in James does mean that social services may no
longer be forced upon a recipient in his home, what will its effect be?
Under New York's policy, home visits to recipients of AFDC are to be
made once every three months.80 Although heavy case loads perhaps
dictate this small number of visits, the amount of benefit derived from
four visits a year is likely minimal. The recent study in Wisconsin men-
tioned earlier revealed that visits of caseworkers to recipients of AFDC
amounted to a thirty-minute chat every three months."' The authors of
the report reached the following conclusion:
Our overall finding was that very little social service activity goes
on. This follows from the pattern of caseworker visits. Since the case-
workers visit the clients so infrequently and for such short periods of
time, there is of necessity very little supportive service work or regu-
lation of client's lives.
32
Thus the decision in James may not have so drastic an effect on the
AFDC program as the dissenting judge anticipated.
The question remains whether the standard of probable cause enunci-
ated in Camara is applicable to visits of caseworkers for the purposes of
either determining eligibility or searching for evidence of welfare fraud.
As a practical matter, the two purposes may be indistinguishable: in
either instance the informatoin sought can be used not only to terminate
welfare assistance but also to initiate criminal prosecution based on
fraudulent misrepresentation. 3 These relatively severe consequences
" Judge McLean attacked the majority opinion in James on this point: "If...
the welfare worker can obtain a warrant merely by pointing out the need to in-
spect the home in order to carry out her duties, then the warrant is a mere for-
mality." 303 F. Supp. at 946 (dissenting opinion).
'Id. at 938.
"Handler & Hollingsworth, supra note 10, at 8.
12 Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
"N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 145 (McKinney 1966) provides in part:
Any person who by means of a false statement or representation, or by
a deliberate concealment of any material fact, or by impersonation or other
fraudulent device, obtains or attempts to obtain, or aids or abets any person
to obtain public assistance or care to which he is not entitled, or does any
wilful act designed to interfere with the proper administration of public
assistance and care, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, unless such act con-
stitutes a violation of a provision of the penal law of the state of New York,
[Vol. 481016
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weigh heavily against relaxing the standard of probable cause for obtain-
ing a warrant for these purposes; the same degree of justification should
be shown to the issuing magistrate as the police officer must show before
he initiates his search for evidence of a crime."4 This conclusion does
not mean that welfare eligibility cannot be checked: "[L] ess drastic means
may be suggested for achieving the same basic purposes for which the
City and State urge home visits are designed."
35
The consent of the recipient eliminates the requirement of a warrant
for welfare officials to enter his home. 6 Does a citizen who accepts
public assistance impliedly consent to a search of his home in order for
the caseworker to review his continuing eligibility? After James, this
question must be answered in the negative.3 7 But if the recipient ex-
pressly agrees to the visit, will the courts show the same reluctance to
find legally effective consent as they have in scrutinizing police searches?
Consent to a search in criminal cases, to be legally effective, must be
in which case he shall be punished in accordance with the penalties fixed
by such law .... Whenever a public welfare official has reason to believe
that any person has violated any provision of this section, he shall refer
the facts and evidence available to him to the appropriate district attorney
or other prosecuting official [emphasis added].
"A representative definition of probable cause is:
Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within their [the
officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy infor-
mation are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution
in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.
Bringar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
" 303 F. Supp. at 943. The court deciding James suggested some alternatives
to home visits:
Proof of actual residence may be ascertained . . .by the submission of a
duly-executed lease upon the premises in question. Family composition
may be verified by the submission . . . of birth certificates. The physical
well-being of the child could be safeguarded by making available facilities
for periodic medical examinations rather than by requiring routine home
visits by caseworkers .... Information regarding goods or services which
the recipient may need in the management of her home can equally be ob-
tained in the offices of the Department should the recipient wish to make
her needs known there rather than in the convenience of her home. The
regularity of school attendance, academic achievement . . . can more ac-
curately reflect the effects of a child's home environment than an interview
with his or her parents in the home.
Id.
The objection may be raised that home visits are necessary to discover the
presence of persons residing in the home who owe a legally enforceable duty of
support to the recipient or to discover possession of unreported gifts of personal
property. The answer is that visits for such purposes can be made by obtaining
a search warrant based on the requisite probable cause.
ZI Cf. Calhoun v. United States, 172 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1949).
"303 F. Supp. at 945; accord, Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260,
425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967).
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given as an "understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional
right." ' The burden on the government of demonstrating the volun-
tariness of the consent is heavier when the person whose home was
searched is illiterate.39 Professor Jacobus tenBroek has observed that
recipients of AFDC payments in California are "[o]nly slightly educated
-a third of them have not passed beyond grammar school and they
average a ninth grade education . ,,20 Perhaps any waiver to a search
that is given by a recipient with so little education is prima facie ineffective.
The disparity of position between the caseworker and the welfare
recipient makes it unlikely that any consent given is wholly without com-
pulsion. To be effective, consent cannot have been granted in "sub-
mission to authority."41
[C]aseworkers . . . represent ... authority to the recipient, authority
whose mere presence constitutes coercion to some degree and whose
request to enter, however politely phrased, is in the nature of an order.
Even more important, the readily available means by which authority
may be exerted is sharp in her mind. She is almost certain to feel
that refusal to consent will bear adversely on her aid grant and thus
deprive her and her children of their only source of support.42
In Parrish, the California Supreme Court relied on this inherent coercion
to nullify the recipients' consent to pre-dawn searches. 43
Since the recipient of welfare payments now has the right to demand
a search warrant before a welfare official can visit him in his private
residence, the only procedure likely to assure that consent to the visita-
tion is freely given is for the official to advise the recipient of his fourth-
amendment rights. Especially should the official advise the recipient that
his refusal to consent to a visit will in no way affect his welfare pay-
ments. This method, which would be similar to the Miranda warnings,44
may not be an ideal solution, but informed, reliable consent is necessary
if caseworkers are ever to be able to visit welfare recipients in their homes.
" Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948).
" Kovach v. United States, 53 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1931).
0 tenBroek, Californidas Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Develop-
went, and Present Status, 17 STAN. L. REV. 614, 670 (1965).
"'Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); accord, Pekar v. United
States, 315 F.2d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1963), in which the court stated that if "su-
perior authority had any place in the obtaining of the consent [to search], the
consent is no consent at all . .. ."'2 tenBroek, supra note 41, at 669-70.
466 Cal. 2d at 270, 425 P.2d at 229, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
"The warnings to be given to a person under custodial interrogation may be
found in Miranda v. Arizonia, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1965).
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The decision in James will no doubt be subjected to much criticism,
but in view of the dual nature of a public caseworker's duties, the court,
in requiring warrants for all home visits, reached a very practical solution.
To attempt to draw a distinction regarding the applicability of the
[Fourth] Amendment dependent upon whether the caseworker intends
to counsel the recipient as to how best to utilize his limited resources
or to look for evidence of fraud would invite a trial of every official's
purpose-a task which would undoubtedly pervert the intent of the
Amendment.
45
Although intrusion into a welfare recipient's home is motivated by the
highest public purpose, "[e]xperience should teach us to be most on our
guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent."4
F. FINCHER JARRELL
Uniform Commercial Code-Checks-Cash Deduction from Check
Prior to Deposit as Final Payment under Article Four
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in Kirby v. First & Mer-
chants National Bank1 recently applied Article Four of the UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE2 to reach a result that may be surprising to bankers in the
states that have adopted the U.C.C.' The court held that the bank had
made a final cash payment under section 4-213 (1) (a) 4 of the U.C.C. when
it permitted a customer to make a cash deduction from a check that was
being deposited.5
303 F. Supp. at 942.
O Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (dissenting opinion of
Justice Brandeis).
-210 Va. 88, 168 S.E.2d 273 (1969).
'The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.] has been codi-
fied in VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.1-.10 (1965). References infra will be to the Code
as adopted in Virginia, but the number 8 will be omitted.
'Every state except Louisiana has now adopted the U.C.C. The U.C.C. is
found in N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 25 (1965). For a basic study of Article 4 as adopted
in North Carolina, see Davis, Article Four: Bank Deposits and Collections, 44
N.C.L. REv. 627 (1966).
'§ 4-213(1) (a) provides:
(1) An item is finally paid by a payor bank when the bank has done
any of the following, whichever happens first:
(a) paid the item in cash;
210 Va. at -, 168 S.E.2d at 276.
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